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INTRODUCTION
On 26 December 2004, media broadcasts were flooded with reports of tsunami-ravaged areas in Southeast Asia. These graphic images and initial estimates of the human death toll and catastrophic property damage captured the world's attention. As the days passed, the tragedy unfolded before our eyes as the casualty estimates escalated from a couple thousand, to tens of thousands, to hundreds of thousands. What appeared to be an isolated incident became a broadranging catastrophe that impacted thousands of communities and directly affected nine countries.
By the end of the year, US forces from around the globe were being mobilized to offer support to the effected countries. Eventually, the US established Combined Task in Thailand, with the Marine Corps' III Marine Expeditionary Force's Commanding General as the CTF Commander. The Operation became known as UNIFIED ASSISTANCE. Two Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) were diverted from their scheduled routes to provide assistance, which included subsistence, medical support, light engineering and extensive debris removal.
The US military did not work in isolation; they were one part of a multi-faceted effort that included the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), Private Organizations (PVOs), and other agencies.
The US military's, specifically the US Marine Corps', relief effort was not the only operation of its kind in which US Marine forces were involved. Over an 18-month period, the Marine Corps responded to the tsunami in Southeast Asia, the earthquake in Pakistan, Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, and a typhoon in the Philippines. The global natural disasters of [2004] [2005] illuminated the point that the Marine Corps is more than just a military service called upon to conduct combat operations. The Marine Corps proved that it had evolved into a rapidly deployable expeditionary force called upon to respond to the world's natural disasters, in addition to conducting combat operations. The Marine Corps possesses the most responsive means to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) to effected areas, and the MEU's organic capabilities make it the Marine Corps most rapidly deployable Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) best postured to execute the assigned missions.
The increasing range of missions executed by the military is ever on the rise and raises the question, "What is the best use of the MEU as it relates to the nation's national military strategy?" The MEU has been a strategic asset since its inception. As the United States attempts to validate the military's roles and resource expenditures, the U.S. Marine Corps must constantly assess and reassess the value it provides to our nation. The Marine Corps' legacy and longevity will only be assured by capitalizing upon and enhancing those capabilities that provide the greatest value to our nation. The strategic threats the United States faces today are different than those faced by our nation when the current MEU/MEU(SOC) concept was first implemented.
Some twenty years have elapsed, yet the MEU's missions, structure and utility have not significantly evolved: the MEU of today looks much like the MEU of the early 1980s. Change for the sake of change is never a good approach, but making changes after objectively assessing current capabilities in relation to current roles and potential opportunities is an inherent responsibility of our military's leadership. The MEU has played, and will continue to play, a substantial role in projecting the United States' power around the globe and responding to humanitarian crises around the world; however, the personnel and equipment required to most effectively execute these divergent missions is categorically different. The current MEU composition is designed principally to provide a flexible sea-based MAGTF capable of rapidly executing amphibious operations -it continues to work well.
1 But in order to respond to the next humanitarian crisis, as well as shape the environment for the future, a MEU tailored to mitigate human suffering and help communities in their recovery efforts has the potential to project a positive image around the globe, and ultimately facilitate future alliances and assistance that serve the United States' long term strategic interests.
According to international political analyst John W. Rendon, "The US military operation for Tsunami relief is the only strategic victory in the GWOT in four years." 2 The Navy-Marine
Corps team has the resources and ability to hone this capability and take the fight to the enemy, but not in the traditional sense. We must begin to think differently -"outside the box"-if we are to effectively parlay our military capabilities and efforts into strategic, surgical wins. Creating a unit that systematically plans deliberate humanitarian missions, and is ready to respond to natural disasters while maintaining its combat capability fosters a synergy that could effectively and deliver a positive diplomatic message to the international audience. By doing so, the United The MAU (SOC) and then MEU(SOC)s were designed to be self-sustaining combined arms teams capable of responding to a range of missions.
BEYOND THE KINETIC -US MILITARY OPERATIONS
Effectively employing units with the primary mission of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and non-combatant evacuation operations takes the Marine unit out of the traditional mindset of kinetic operations. This may prove to be the way U.S. forces effectively counter terrorists, insurgents and other rogue non-state actors, who are able to marginalize our kinetic strengths. In a phrase, we can beat them at their own game. Humanitarian assistance is an opportunity to engage and gain access to otherwise inaccessible countries, or those that are reluctant to giving medical attention or pulling teeth, show Americans at their best. Even though the participants wear uniforms, the recipients view the help as that of the American people, not necessarily that of the military. They like us, or they at least like what we can do for them.
Because of the positive outlook and press that surround such operations, they should be given priority as missions, and cease relegation to the "sidelines" in favor of other more kinetic missions.
Civil military missions may not seem be what the military has traditionally done, but they may be the most effective use of our military. These missions are often viewed as distractions when developing and training our combat troops, but in this era of counter-insurgency, success in combat missions does not necessarily build all of the partnerships needed. Developing mutually beneficial partnerships can prevent the rise in insurgencies that intend to do harm to or exploit the populations within unstable countries, particularly those countries in Africa, South East Asia and Latin America. These targeted civil military operations are the foundation for shaping the future environment so it is favorable to the United States. While at the same time the forces can present the good will of the American people and provide needed structures or services to the people living in these unstable areas.
Although it appears difficult for the impatient American to understand, there is merit in participating in operations that do not bring immediately tangible results, but instead plant the seeds to win the battle a decade, or even a generation from now, a task that requires strategic patience. These types of operations are how we counter the ideological support for terrorism.
Countering this ideological support is where victory lies, and the U.S. military needs to leverage such encounters. Humanitarian assistance missions can shape the battlefield for the future so that when given a choice, the population or government of a nation supports the U.S. and her allies instead of the extremist group that espouses anti-U.S. propaganda, or makes empty promises. The U.S. needs to shape the future so that it is not enmeshed in constant combat with nations we know little about. The US must engage in preventive actions in the outlying areas of Africa, South East Asia and Latin America before we find ourselves embroiled in combat operations in those same areas. People from other nations may not like the U.S. or even want U.S. personnel within their borders, but it is difficult to find an individual that does not respect the humanitarian actions of the U.S. military. This respect can, and should, be leveraged and exploited to our advantage to the greatest extent possible.
MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE /DISASTER RELIEF) MEU (HA/DR)
The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review re-categorized the nation's national defense challenges and identified the separate, but overlapping strategic mission sets: homeland defense, war on terror/irregular warfare, conventional campaigns, and deterrence (global, transnational and regional). 5 The Navy/Marine Corps team was identified as the force of choice to best meet the on-going demand for a force capable of fostering and strengthening emerging and existing alliances. The United States can further exploit this ability to shape the environment by utilizing the Navy/Marine Corps team's capabilities to conduct theater engagement with a uniquely tailored MEU that has an enhanced capability to conduct Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster
Relief (HA/DR) and civil military operations, having the ability impact theater security. This The mission and nature of the MEU(HA/DR) may on the surface appear to limit the flexibility of the MEU, but it will enhance and add civil military capabilities, which increases the Combatant Commander's spectrum of theater engagement opportunities; this requires 
STRUCTURE OF THE MEU (HA/DR)
The structure of the MEU (HA/DR) will differ from today's MEU. It will still employ 
TRAINING
In order for the newly evolved MEU to be truly effective the training and associated Special Operations Training Group (SOTG) evaluation or "SOC certification" needs to be updated. How realistic is it to get 6 disjointed missions within a 4 day period with 6 hours to plan each mission, while being evaluated by your successor? There is no realism in the current evaluation system. Training needs to be realistic, progressive, involve true civilians, and have credible evaluators. We need to divorce ourselves from a scenario that is too "scripted". The training needs to be viewed in a holistic manner, instead of a series of exercises with a definitive finish line. The training needs to be continuous and incrementally challenging, meaning, it needs to start prior to or at D-180 and it should continue until the forces arrive back at home-station from a deployment.
The training should integrate Department of State, Country Teams, USAID, NGO and media personnel at a minimum. Some training needs to be focused on the external organizations the MEU (HA/DR) will most likely encounter during crises which will provide an opportunity to learn the capabilities and limitations of each. Pre-deployment training should include an exercise incorporating the non-DOD players in full spectrum scenarios: for example a USAID representative needs to do an assessment in a remote village. US forces have to escort him to the village, the convoy is ambushed, the assessment is done, a MEDCAP is employed, the situation deteriorates and a NEO is performed. 
DEPLOYMENT OF THE MEU (HA/DR)
The MEU (HA/DR) will bring flexibility to the theater. Because there will be a limited number of MEU (HA/DR)s, they will have the capability of being inserted by multiple methods.
The primary method of insertion will be by naval amphibious shipping. Having the MEU (HA/DR) as part of a multiple ship Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) tied into a larger Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) will allow the MEU (HA/DR) to conduct split ARG operations. This will stretch the operational reach of the ARG to two distinct locations and/or missions, giving the national authority the ability to respond to two crises simultaneously. The disadvantages of naval shipping are that its availability is determined by shipping and maintenance schedules, so it cannot be employed 24/7/365. The distinct advantage of amphibious shipping is its capability to have 15 days of sustainment, while at the same time it offers the opportunity to house personnel involved in operations if restrictions prohibit, or forces are limited from bedding down in a country at night, such as was the case in Banda Ache, Indonesia during the tsunami relief. In addition, naval personnel possessing critical skills could participate in civil military operations, specifically medical and dental personnel, and linguists if they are present.
The MEU (HA/DR) must have multiple deployment methods because it will be a lowdensity resource. It must be a force that can deploy the right personnel and equipment mix to the right place, in the shortest amount of time. The method best suited for this quick surgical deployment is Strategic Airlift; however, the reliability and accessibility of this option means it cannot be the primary means of deployment. The disadvantages are that an operational airfield may not be in close proximity to the disaster due to inherent infrastructure networks or the degraded capacity or capability due to the disaster and lift limits the amount of equipment and relief supplies that can be flown in a timely manner.
The third method of deployment, which would offer the least flexibility unless already pre-positioned near the point of disaster is the ships of the Maritime Pre-positioning Squadrons (MPS). The personnel of the MEU (HA/DR) could fly-in and marry up with the equipment of the MPS. The advantage is that the MPS has with it a large footprint of supplies especially useful in an environment where a natural disaster may limit the ability to procure supplies, especially fuel. The disadvantages are that MPS ships are not ideally configured for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief so multiple ships may require off-load to reach the equipment necessary to conduct the mission. The nature of MPS shipping is such that it may already be engaged in an exercise or operation or it may be too far away to be realistically feasible as an option, especially if the disaster is in a remote area that requires the use of tactical aircraft. In addition, MPS requires a robust port facility or an adequate beach area to operate.
Training to the use of all three methods of deployment provides the greatest flexibility for implementation. Up-to-date plans and training will allow the national command authority to employ the right force, at the right time, by the right method. It also allows a response to include a variety of methods with a scalable response capability.
CONCLUSIONS
Theater engagement has historically been something the military does when it is not otherwise engaged -it has not been a priority. However, in order to make significant gains in the war against extremist ideologies, the military and the nation need to shape the environment so that the United States is not surprised when the next terrorist/insurgent movement flares up in a country we had the opportunity to peacefully engage when the costs were minimal.
The MEU (HA/DR) will provide the national command a flexible and responsive capability that projects a positive image of the United States. While doing so, it capitalizes on the strengths of the military services and provides a unique solution to counter an emerging threat. It allows the U.S. to shape the potential theaters of engagement through benign operations, which produce lasting and worthwhile results.
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